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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BEVERLY KAY CHRISTENSEN
Plaintiff- Appellant
vs.
Case No. 16459
ALFRED BRENT CHRISTENSEN
Defendant-Respondent

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE

Plaintiff, Beverly Kay Christensen, commenced a civil
action against the defendant, Alfred Brent Christensen, Case No.
239969, in the District Court of Salt Lake County, claiming fraud in
.:::onnection with a divorce decree previously entered by that court in
Case No. D-20185.

During the pendency of the fraud action (No.

239969), plaintiff filed a motion and order to show cause in the
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divorce matter, seeking both modification and enforcement of the
divorce decree.

Both matters were consolidated for hearing.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Both matters were heard before the Honorable Ernest F.
Baldwin, Jr., on the 14, 15 and 16 days of February 1979.

There-

after, and on April 16, 1979, Judge Baldwin entered his order in the
fraud action (No. 293369), finding in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiff, No Cause for Action.

He also entered an order

upon order to show cause in the divorce matter (No. D-20185),
granting plaintiff partial relief under the petition for enforcement of
the decree, and denying her claim for modification.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have the denial of the lower court to
modify the decree reversed, and to have that aspect of the court's
decision recommended for further proceedings.

Defendant seeks

to have the lower court's decision affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 31, 1975, plaintiff commenced a divorce action
against the defendant, seeking termination of a 16 year marriage.
Plaintiff was represented by counsel, who prepared a complaint
which set forth in substantial detail all of the assets of the marriage
(R D-20185, p. 2-7).

Thereafter, 1he parties and plaintiff's counsel

negotiated a settlement agreement which was the result of several
telephone conferences, and at least one face-to-face conference
between the parties and plaintiff's counsel (T. 164).

Plaintiff's counsel

prepared a stipulation and property settlement agreement which was
executed by the parties and incorporated into the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce entered by the court.
During the negotiations and discussions, defendant was
requested to give his opinion as to the value of the properties of the
parties, which he did (T. 165, 206, 207).

Plaintiff discussed these

properties and their values with her attorney (T. 32, 33), who
advised her to have the properties appraised, if she had any questions
about their values (T. 25, 167), and with Clement Tebbs, a friend
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and an accountant (T. 32, 137), who also advised her to have an
appraisal made (T. 137).

Plaintiff opted to proceed without additional

information, and executed and filed the agreement her attorney had
prepared.
Plaintiff also, based upon the agreement and the other
representations to the court, obtained an order waiving the statutory
90 day waiting period, and the statutory interlocutory period.

On August 5, 1976, plaintiff filed an affidavit to support
an order to show cause, claiming that defendant had misrepresented
the value of the assets, and that she had been prevented by the
defendant from presenting to the court and fully litigating the issue
of her rights to the properties acquired during the marriage (R. D20185, p. 45-46).

Defendant objected, and the Honorable Dean E.

Conder ruled that plaintiff's relief properly should be sought by a
separate action.

Plaintiff thereafter, on January 13, 1977, com-

menced Civil Action No. 239969, alleging fraud and requesting the
court to impress a constructive trust upon the property awarded to
defendant by the Decree of Divorce, and to award damages to
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plaintiff (R. 229969, p. 2-5).
Plaintiff's main complaint centers around an apartment
complex located at 320 Gordon Lane, Salt Lake County, known as the
Spring Hollow Apartments, and which were listed in plaintiff's
divorce complaint.

Defendant testified that the value of the apartments

was estimated by him, based upon information given to him by the
mortgage holder, at approximately $460, 000 (R. 59).

Exhibit 20-D,

the work notes of E. H. Fankhauser, plaintiff's attorney, shows the
value figure at $485, 000.

In addition, plaintiff, prior to exexution of

the settlement agreement, talked with Clement Tebbs, who gave his
opinion as to value at $550, 000 (R. 187).

All of these estimated values

were known by plaintiff, and were referred to in her discussions with
her attorney and, in fact, during one conference with her attorney,
plaintiff was advised that the proposed settlement would give her
"about sixty-nine thousand, and him two hundred and three," and that
the proposal was not reasonable, and for her "not to take it" (R. 162).
The parties thereafter continued to negotiate, and an agreement was
made, which plaintiff advised her attorney she wanted to accept,
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although he still expressed concern over the values used (R. 168).
Plaintiff was well represented, had made independent inquiries, chose
not to have the properties appraised, and was in no way excluded by
the defendant from making any determination she or her attorney
desired to make.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION.
The matter of modification of a Decree of Divorce has been
left to the discretion of the trial court, with the controlling legal
principal being:
"
that a divorce decree may not be modified
unless it is alleged, proved and the trial court
finds that the circumstances upon which it was
based have undergone a substantial change."
See Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 U 261, 225 P 76;
Osmus v. Osmus, 114 U 216, 198 P. 2d 233; and
Gale v. Gale, 123 U 277, 258 P. 2d 986.
It has likewise been the position of this court that the public

interest requires that there l;>e an end to litigation and, as stated in
Klein v. Klein, 544 P. 2d 472:
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rd

11
and that judgment having been affirmed by
this court in July 1973, it became final and
absolute; and that the trial court could not
properly change or modify that decree except
for subsequent change in circumstances. The
correctness of that proposition under usual
circumstances and as applied to a definite and
final judgment and decree in a divorce action,
to the end that the same matters cannot be litigated
~' is acknowledged."
(Emphasis mine).

Here, the plaintiff has attempted a two-edged attack on a
divorce decree that she obtained, based upon an agreed stipulation
negotiated and prepared by her attorney.

She claims fraud on one

side, and change of circumstances on the other.
The court heard this matter at length, and all evidence
presented by plaintiff was presented to support both edges of her attack,
The trial court was not impressed with the fraud claim of plaintiff,
and found that there were neither wilful misquotations by defendant,
fraudulent representations by defendant, concealment of assets or
financial condition by defendant, nor reliance by plaintiff (R. Case
No. 239969, p. 80, 81, 82).
Since the plaintiff is not appealing from the court's finding
in Case No. 239969, the fraud action, the matter to be considered is
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whether or not a material change of the circumstances upon whic': -'.:
decree was based exists.

This subject was addressed by this co·~r: '.::

the case of Perkins v. Perkins, 522 P. 2d 709, where the court,
quoting _.\nderson v. Anderson, 13 u2. d 36, 368 P. 2d 264, said:
" ... the generalization of Title 30-3-5, -Ctah Code
Annotated 19 53, contemplates an opportuni:y for
the divorced litigants to come into court :·or modification of the original decree based upon changed
circumstances, and that any dissatisfaction wi:h
such decree is a matter of appeal. _.\bsem on
appeal, it is not subject to modification except
where such changed conditions are demonstrated.
Speaking also to this, the court, in Trego \', Trego,
565 P. 2d 74, said:
'''\-hen there has been an adjudication on one se: of
facts, that should be res adjudicata, and :here
should be no modification unless some substandal
change of circumstances would warranT doL11g so.
It appears from the evidence presented that the plain::::

feels that had she followed the advice of her attorney, and had she ·~st:
the information that was always available to her, that she may ha·:e
received more by way of property settlement than she agreed rn acce::

This all apparently is based upon the great real escate appraisa:. :::: :'
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perfect hind sight. " >;\'hat she o>-erlooks is that the defendant was
required to pay all of the mortgages --- whether suificient income
is generated or not --- and pay all of t..1-ie taxes and property insurance
on :-ier property and house.

These are benefits to her that must be

considered in reviewing the senlemem agreement.
In the case of Sorensen v. Sorensen, 20 V. 2d 360, 438
P. 2d 180, this court said:

" ... Generally, the court is required to give such
a decree the final status accorded to any civil
judgment and to apply the goctrine of res judicata
thereto . . . Our statute permits subsequent changes
which are reasonable and proper. This has been
construed to empower the court to make a modification where there has been a substantial change in the
material circumstances of either one or both of the
parties since the decree was entered. An application
for a modification should be subjected to thorough
s cruriny by the court. "
It appears that the trial court did subject the request ior
modification to a thorough scrutiny and, considering all of the facts,
including the values placed upon the properties by the various witnesses
before the court, determined that the circumstances since the entry of
:..'1e decree have not changed sufficiently to warrant a modification to
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increase plaintiff's property holdings, as she requested.
Since the trial court did not find the distribution of assets
to be unjust or inequitable to either party, defendant submits that the
"latitude of discretion" allowed the trial court in the matter of Klein v.
Klein (supra) should be allowed the trial court here, and the decision
should not be disturbed.
CONCLUSION
From the evidence, it appears that the court properly
determined that no change of" circumstances exists, and that appellant's
complaint before the court is one relative to her dissatisfaction with
the settlement negotiated by her and her attorney at the time of the
divorce.
Under the facts before the court, the determination of the
trial court should stand.
Respectfully submitted,

WALTER R. ELLETT

Attorney for Respondent
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